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mergers and acquisitions reveals a significant share of unprofitable mergers and 
economic theory, moreover, demonstrates that privately unprofitable mergers can 
be the result of rational action. Therefore, we drop this restrictive assumption and 
allow for unprofitable mergers to occur. This exerts a considerable impact on mer-
ger policy conclusions: while several insights of the original analysis are corroborat-
ed (f.i. efficiency defence), a positive external effect does not represent a sufficient 
condition for the allowance of a merger anymore. Applying such a rule would 
cause a considerable amount of false decisions.  
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1. Introduction 
The framework for analysing horizontal mergers introduced by Farrell and Shapiro 
(1990) has become very popular in industrial and business economics. In the con-
text of the so-called ‘more-economic approach to competition policy’ (Neven 
2006), this framework additionally enjoys an increasing importance for empirical 
and policy analyses of horizontal mergers and, consequently, also for the self-
assessment of business companies considering a merger project. One of the most 
distinctive characteristics of the Farrell-Shapiro-framework (FSF) is the conceptual 
differentiation between an ‘internal effect’ (on the merging companies) and an ‘ex-
ternal effect’ (on the competitors of the merging companies and on the consum-
ers). This allows for a clarified interpretation of an ‘efficiency defence’: the total 
welfare of a horizontal merger is positive if the positive internal effect overcompen-
sates a negative external effect. Furthermore, any horizontal merger entailing a 
positive external effect is deemed to be welfare-enhancing (Farrell and Shapiro 
1990: 109, 117; 1991: 1009). This policy conclusion is rooted in a crucial assump-
tion: since rational enterprises will only engage in a merger if the combination in-
creases the profitability of the merged entity compared to the non-merged compa-
nies, Farrell and Shapiro (1990: 109, 116; 1991: 1007) assume that only profitable 
mergers will occur (the increase in profits might either be a result of efficiencies, for 
instance, synergy effects or economies of scale, or a result of market power), i.e. 
the internal effect of rational mergers is always positive. In doing so, they find 
themselves in line with the majority of industrial economics analyses of horizontal 
mergers. 
 
Although the limitation to profitable mergers on the grounds of the rationality as-
sumption appears to be straightforward, the empirical picture differs significantly. 
According to the vast majority of empirical studies on merger profitability, a con-
siderable share of horizontal mergers fails to enhance profitability ex post (section 
2). Moreover, it can be argued that unprofitable mergers might well be undertaken 
by rational agents (section 2). Therefore, we re-configure the FSF by introducing 
the possibility of unprofitable mergers to occur (section 3). Against this back-
ground, we review the policy conclusions given by Farrell and Shapiro (section 4). 
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While we support some of their recommendations, we also find cases in which the 
disregard of unprofitable mergers impedes a welfare-maximising merger policy. 
 
2. (Un-)Profitability of Mergers 
The comprehensive empirical literature on the profitability of mergers is typically 
classified into two methodological approaches: firstly, the ‘success’ of a merger is 
evaluated against the background of data from balance sheets pre- and post-
merger, so-called outcome studies. These studies generally identify a significant 
share of mergers that decrease profits as well as profitability post-merger. Depend-
ing on the analysed timeframe and the included industries, the ratio of unprofita-
ble mergers lies between 25 and 50 per cent (Ravenscraft and Scherer 1987; Kaplan 
and Weisbach 1992; Tichy 2001: 354-358; Gugler et al. 2003; Pautler 2003; Röller 
et al. 2006: 111-135). This share tends to increase with the transaction volume of 
the merger. Gugler et al. (2003) find that merely about 30 per cent succeeded in 
improving both profits and sales compared to a control group of non-merging 
companies. Furthermore, indication exists that internal growth performs systemati-
cally better than external growth through M&A-activity (Dickerson et al. 1997). 
Secondly, so-called event studies analyse stock market reactions to merger an-
nouncements. The underlying idea is that capital markets reflect the profitability 
changes in the course of mergers and acquisitions through the evolution of (ab-
normal) stock returns. While studies that restrict themselves to a short window of 
time around the announcement generally find a large share of value-increasing 
mergers, those that employ a longer window of time - in particular extending to 
several years post-merger - show a wide distribution of results with a generally 
negative mean tendency (Rau and Vermaelen 1998; Andrade et al. 2001; Tichy 
2001: 349-354; Pautler 2003; Röller et al. 2006: 111-135). 
 
Each of these studies may be criticised on methodological grounds (e.g. Beigi and 
Budzinski 2013) and their results are far from being homogeneous or mutually 
congruent. However, irrespective of the diversity of methods and irrespective of the 
respectively derived share of unprofitable mergers, the empirical picture clearly 
shows that unprofitable mergers do occur and do not represent a rare or negligible 
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exception. This alone justifies to include the possibility of unprofitable mergers in 
policy-relevant modelling. Does it, however, really contradict the model assump-
tions? In the FSF, it is assumed that rational enterprises engage only in profitable 
mergers. In principle, this offers scope for irrational (unprofitable) mergers. Howev-
er, it seems a priori dissatisfying to label all unprofitable mergers ‘irrational’. There-
fore, the question arises whether rational agents might engage in unprofitable 
mergers. So, why do unprofitable mergers occur?  
 
First, certain mergers might well entail efficiency potentials but fail to realise these 
potentials post-merger. Post-merger management is not a trivial task and overcom-
ing differing enterprise cultures frequently turns out to be a lengthy and costly pro-
cess (Cartwright and Cooper 1993; Pablo 1994). In particular the process of post-
merger realizing one of the empirically most important synergy source, operational 
synergies (i.e. combining administrative functions like the integration of depart-
ments in order to reduce overhead costs), is often met with strong resistance from 
employees, unions and local politicians (Kotter and Schlesinger 1998) which, ac-
cording to empirical studies, frequently leads to increasing instead of decreasing 
costs post-merger (inter alia, Seth 1990; Chatterjee 1992; Pablo 1994; Mukherjee et 
al. 2004; Fulghieri and Hodrick 2006; Chakravorty 2012).1 Moreover, inability of 
post-merger management to successfully deal with X-inefficiencies represents an-
other source of post-merger cost increases (Leibenstein 1966, 1992). Second, avail-
able information will generally be imperfect (and maybe distorted) at the time of 
the merger decision, i.e. the ex ante assessment of the profitability of a merger pro-
ject may prove to be wrong ex post. In both cases, enterprises engage bounded-
rationally in eventually unprofitable mergers because at the time of decision they 
expect to form a profitable combination: ex ante profitable merger projects turn 
out to be unprofitable ex post. Thus, a rationally conducted merger may uninten-
tionally turn out to have unprofitable effects. These cases constitute ‘rational un-
profitable mergers’ in the sense that they were conducted rationally (because of 
expected profits) and result in unprofitable outcomes. 
1 For an overview and a more comprehensive discussion of the extensive literature on synergy po-
tentials of mergers and the empirics of their post-merger realization see Budzinski and 
Kretschmer (2009). 
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Third, principal-agent problems between owners and managers can promote un-
profitable mergers (Firth 1980; Jensen 1986). Rational managers will maximise their 
individual utility. Elements of the respective utility functions might include income, 
power, prestige, publicity or career opportunities - factors that depend more upon 
the size and growth of the company than on profitability (Jensen 1986; Tichy 
2001). The literature refers to concepts like empire building (Shleifer and Vishny 
1988; Trautwein 1990), hubris (Roll 1986), or free cash (Jensen 1986; Bruner 1988). 
Fourth, consultants may also be self-interested and, therefore, promote unprofita-
ble mergers because creating a merger can be more profitable for consultants than 
preventing a merger. Moreover, post-merger re-organisation represents a lucrative 
follow-up business. Obviously, rational consultants will not promote unprofitable 
mergers if they can be made responsible for this ex post (negative reputation ef-
fects). However, in combination with imperfect ex ante information, it may be diffi-
cult and ambiguous to identify the reasons of failure in ex post evaluation. Why, for 
instance, did the Daimler-Chrysler merger fail? Was it wrong from the beginning or 
due to bad policy post-merger or even external, unpredictable market circumstanc-
es (e.g. the unexpected decline of the SUV-segment in the U.S.)? Thus, rational 
consultants might expect to escape without reputation damage, in particular if the 
assessment is a close call (i.e. a merger project is on the brink of profitability). An 
unambiguously unprofitable merger, however, can hardly be explained along these 
lines. In these two cases, resulting mergers might not be rational from an enter-
prise point of view, but they are, nevertheless, the result of individually rational 
agents acting within organisations (with normal control problems). Consequently, 
ex ante unprofitable merger projects are conducted as a result of rational individual 
action. 
 
Fifth, preemptive and defensive mergers might occur (Fridolfsson and Stennek 
2005). Company A might decide to merge with company B despite a lack of profit-
ability of this combination in order to prevent B from merging with C (building of a 
powerful competitor) - an alternative that would be even worse for company A. 
Similarly, a merger might be done in order to prevent a hostile takeover of any 
merging party by C (white knight mergers). Although unprofitable in absolute 
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terms, preemptive and defensive mergers might represent the less unprofitable 
choice for a specific enterprise. Thus, an unprofitable merger is rationally undertak-
en. 
 
Sixth, mergers and especially merger waves are explained with psychological phe-
nomena, like herd behaviour (merging because everyone else merges), information 
cascades, framing effects, etc. It is debatable whether such phenomena belong to 
rational behaviour or not. While advanced concepts of rationality - referring to hu-
man cognitive and mental processes and their limits - would include them (Kahne-
man 2003a, 2003b; Budzinski 2003), these modes of behaviour might well fall out-
side more traditional concepts of rationality.  
 
In summary, empirical evidence shows that unprofitable mergers occur with con-
siderable frequency and theoretical explanations point out that rational agents 
have incentives to engage in unprofitable mergers. Therefore, merger policy cannot 
rely on a positive internal effect, i.e. that any proposed merger increases the profits 
of the merged entity compared to the single enterprises, either through (procom-
petitive) efficiency gains or through (anticompetitive) exploitation of market power. 
Sound merger policy decisions, thus, require consideration of the frequent occur-
rence of unprofitable mergers with a negative internal effect. In order to demon-
strate the implications of this, we now address the FSF in more detail. 
 
3. Unprofitable Mergers in the Farrell-Shapiro-Framework 
3.1 The Farrell-Shapiro-Framework  
Farrell and Shapiro (1990) use a model of Cournot oligopoly with homogenous 
goods. Inverse demand is given by
 
p X( ), where X is total industry output, p is price 
and ( ) 0<′ Xp . The number of firms is exogenous and given by n, which rules out 
the entry of new firms. Farrell and Shapiro (1990: 110) consider only the entry of 
new firms that behave oligopolistically. The entry by and existence of price-taking 
fringe firms is, however, not ruled out by the model framework. In this case ( )Xp  
can be interpreted as the residual demand curve facing the oligopolists. 
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Firm i’s output and cost functions are given by 
 
xi  and 
 
c i xi( ) , respectively, and 
 
cx
i xi( ) denotes firm i’s marginal cost. Total industry output is, therefore, given by 
 
X = xii=1
n∑  and 
 
yi = x jj≠ i∑ = X − xi summarizes aggregated output of all firms other 
than firm i. 
 
In the Cournot equilibrium, every firm i maximizes its profits,
 
π i xi, yi( )= p xi + yi( )xi − c i xi( ), over its output 
 
xi, given its rivals’ output 
 
yi. The solu-
tion is an output vector 
 
x1,...,xn( ), such that the first-order condition, 
 
∂π i
∂xi
= p X( )+ xi ′ p X( )− cxi xi( )= 0, i =1,...,n,  (1) 
holds for all n firms, whereas the existence and stability of a Cournot equilibrium 
requires the fulfilment of two weak assumptions on a given range: 
(a) Each firm’s reaction curve – which is given by (1) – slopes downward. This is 
equivalent with the requirement that firm i’s marginal revenue is lowered by an 
increase in rivals’ output (Novshek 1985: 90), i.e. 
   
 
′ p xi + yi( )+ xi ′ ′ p xi + yi( )< 0.      (2) 
(b) Firm i’s residual demand curve intersects its marginal cost curve from above. 
Equivalently, 
   
 
cxx
i xi( )> ′ p X( ).      (3) 
The slope of firm i’s reaction schedule can be derived from equation (1): 
 
dxi
dyi
= Ri, 
where 
 
−1< Ri < 0  because of (2) and (3). This means that firm i reduces its output if 
the other firms jointly expand their production. Yet, firm i contracts its output by 
less. Converting the slope of the reaction curve gives: 
   
 
dxi = −λi dX,       (4) 
where 
 
λi = −
Ri
1+ Ri
> 0  under the conditions given by (2) and (3), which measures 
firm i’s “output response to changes in industry output“ (Werden 1991: 1002). 
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This results in the effect of an exogenous output change of firm 1 on the total in-
dustry output, which is given by the “Lemma“ (Farrell and Shapiro 1990: 111): 
Consider an exogenous change in firm 1’s output, and let the other firms’ output 
adjust to re-establish a Cournot equilibrium among themselves. If firms’ reaction 
curves slope downward (condition [2]), and if the stability condition [3] holds, then 
aggregate output moves in the same direction as firm 1’s output, but by less. That 
is: 
 
1> dX
dx1
> 0. 
 
To analyse the effect of a horizontal merger on total output, the cost function of 
the merged entity M, ( )⋅Mc , must be compared with the cost functions of the 
merging firms (“insiders“). The central result is given in proposition 1, whereby “M 
must enjoy substantially lower marginal costs than did its constituent firms, if price 
is to fall“ and industry output increases respectively (Farrell and Shapiro 1990: 112). 
This cost reduction must be larger, the larger the pre-merger market shares of the 
constituent firms were. It is, therefore, not unreasonable to expect a reduction in 
total output as a result of a merger. 
 
The following consideration of the total welfare effects contains the crucial as-
sumption that proposed mergers are privately profitable, i.e. the change in the in-
siders’ (I) total profits is positive (
 
∆π I > 0). Under this central assumption a merger 
will raise welfare if it has a positive external effect on consumers and the nonpartic-
ipant firms („outsiders“) jointly (Farrell and Shapiro 1990: 109). 
 
The sign of the external effect is determined by considering the reaction of the out-
siders O with respect to an output change of the insiders. This allows the determi-
nation of the total effect on outsiders’ profits 
 
π O  and consumer surplus CS. The 
change in equilibrium output by the insiders, 
 
∆XI , can be treated as exogenous 
because “consumers care only about the net effect on aggregate output, 
 
∆X , and 
[...] rivals care only about the change in equilibrium output by the merging (‘insid-
er’) firms, 
 
∆XI , not about what caused that change“ (Farrell and Shapiro 1990: 
114). The total change in insiders’ output 
 
∆XI  is considered as the integral of infini-
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tesimal changes 
 
dXI . First, the external effect is determined due to an infinitesimal 
merger and the total external effect is the integral of the effects of these infinitesi-
mal mergers. The latter are given by 
   

 
dW − dπ I = λi xi − XI
i∈O
∑
 
 
 
 
 
 
≡ η
 
× ′ p X( ) dX .   (5) 
Given the reasons that determine the change in insiders’ output it is particularly 
important to consider the case of an output reduction. Converting η into market 
shares, i.e. 
 
si =
xi
X
, the external effect is positive if the sum of the outsiders’ market 
shares – weighted by their reaction parameters – is larger than the insiders’ market 
shares, i.e. 
 
λi si > sIi∈O∑  (see proposition 4 of Farrell and Shapiro 1990: 115). 
 
In order to determine the total external effect it must be shown that this condition 
is fulfilled along a “path” given by 
 
∆XI . Hence “the net externality is a weighted 
integral of η along a path from 
 
XI
initial  to 
 
XI
final ” (Farrell and Shapiro 1990: 116): 
   
 
∆W − ∆π I = η X( ) − ′ p X( )[ ] dXdXI
dXIX Ifinal
X I
initial
∫ .   (6) 
The lower and upper bound of the integral are given by 
 
X I
final  and 
 
X I
initial respectively 
because the insider output falls from 
 
X I
initial to 
 
X I
final . 
 
In proposition 5 (Farrell and Shapiro 1990: 116), sufficient conditions are given for 
an increase of η as 
 
XI  falls. If these conditions are fulfilled, it follows for 
 
η ≥ 0 be-
fore a merger that an output reducing and profitable merger results in an increase 
in total welfare. Therefore, any proposed merger that is aligned with a positive ex-
ternal effect should be allowed. If the external effect of a merger is negative, the 
reverse does not apply automatically and the positive change in insiders’ profits can 
offset the negative external effect. These conclusions are based on the presumption 
that mergers are only proposed if they are privately profitable, i.e. 
 
∆π I > 0. The case 
of unprofitable mergers is explicitly ruled out of the analysis (Farrell and Shapiro 
1990: 109, 115-116). 
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3.2 Extensions and Modifications 
This section gives a brief literature-based overview of models that modify and en-
hance the FSF. In regards to the aim of this paper, we particularly focus on whether 
the profitability assumption becomes modified. Barros and Cabral (1994) apply the 
FSF to mergers in open economies. They uphold the assumption that only profita-
ble mergers are proposed and introduce merger control authorities. If consumers 
and producers are located in different countries, different objective functions of an 
international merger authority and national authorities and the resulting welfare 
implications are analysed. Levin (1990) analyses the effects of mergers of a fraction 
of firms in markets where the outsiders are restricted to behaving à la Cournot, 
whereas the insiders (i.e. merging firms) are not. The results supplement the ones 
of Farrell and Shapiro (1990). Concerning welfare analysis, the focus lies on profit-
able mergers. Any proposed merger of a fraction of firms with no more than 50 
percent of the premerger market share causes welfare to rise. Also in a Cournot 
setting, Hennessy (2000) regards mergers of a small fraction of firms. He contrasts 
the view that these mergers are motivated by cost efficiencies instead of enhancing 
market power. In doing so, he refers to special industry demand curves that allow 
the occurrence of welfare-reducing mergers because of their private profitability 
even without cost efficiencies. 
 
Verboven (1995) compares the results of the static Cournot model of Farrell and 
Shapiro (1990) with a model of quantity-setting firms that behave collusive. Assum-
ing a linear demand function, the insiders’ maximum allowable market share in the 
case of an output-decreasing capital transfer is higher than with Farrell and Shapiro 
(1990). Yet, this comparison also considers only privately profitable mergers. Spec-
tor (2003) allows for market entries in the FSF and analyses profitable mergers ac-
cording to a consumer welfare standard. If mergers fail to generate synergies or 
economies of scale (not induced by fixed costs), then consumers are harmed, i.e. 
prices are higher, irrespective of entry conditions. Brueckner and Spiller (1991) con-
sider airline networks (hub-and-spoke networks), which are characterised by econ-
omies of density and costs of complementarities. Competition on parts of these 
networks generates negative externalities on markets outside the competitive parts. 
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As a result, mergers on the competitive parts can have net positive gains in con-
sumer surplus, which leads them to the reconsideration of antitrust policy in not 
focussing attention on the parts where market power may increase. They do not, 
however, explicitly consider unprofitable mergers in evaluating the overall welfare 
effect. 
 
Nilssen and Sørgard (1998) regard sequential merger decisions of disjoint groups of 
firms and their intertemporal dependence. Most important with respect to our 
analysis is the strategic motive, which reflects the effect of one merger on possible 
future merger decisions by rival firms, and its implications for policy conclusions. 
Concerning unprofitable mergers the strategic motive explains these in expectation 
of future mergers, which will have a positive feedback for the first. While the policy 
conclusions are derived by explicitly referring to and reconsidering the argumenta-
tion of the FSF, the analysis of Nilssen and Sørgard (1998) is distinct to ours in that 
they refer to the possible intertemporal dependences of merger decisions and the 
effects on the evaluation of welfare effects. Our analysis focuses on the effects of 
introducing unprofitable mergers and the implications on assessment decisions for 
these based on the FSF. 
 
Fridolfsson (2007) analyses endogenous merger formation. In this setup firms have 
strong incentives to engage in anti- rather than pro-competitive mergers. One rea-
son is that firms pre-empt being an outsider of procompetitive mergers, which 
would have a negative external effect on them. The lack of pursuing procompetitive 
mergers, which would result in an output-increase, is the benefit (i.e. external ef-
fect) that outsiders gain from anticompetitive mergers. As a policy conclusion, 
Fridolfsson (2007) regards the assessment of the relevant alternatives to a proposed 
merger, which may be another merger rather than the original market structure. 
However, this approach focuses on an endogenous explanation of the formation of 
unprofitable mergers, whereas we analyse the effects of unprofitable mergers 
(however motivated) in the FSF. 
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Cheung (1992) addresses the problem of an automatic inference from the proposi-
tion of mergers on the creation of a minimal level of required cost savings because 
of the profitability assumption. Since output-increasing mergers can reduce wel-
fare, Cheung (1992: 119-120) shows – by the means of a simple numerical example 
– that these mergers have an incentive to underestimate cost savings in order to 
imitate output-reducing mergers. The application of Farrell and Shapiro’s externali-
ty condition does not handle this problem because proposed mergers are assumed 
to be privately profitable and the fulfilment of the externality condition indicates a 
welfare-improving merger. As a result, some welfare-reducing mergers are allowed. 
He provides his policy conclusions by either obtaining more precise information or 
by banning all output-reducing mergers. Cheung’s numerical example fits as a spe-
cial case of our more general treatment of the problem. 
 
Two specifically interesting papers address an often neglected subcase of the FSF. 
When mergers are privately not profitable (wherefore they are not done) but desir-
able from a total welfare perspective, then according to Faulí-Oller (2002) and 
Dragone et al. (2006) subsidising the unwilling-to-merge firms becomes the wel-
fare-optimal merger policy in a couple of very specific cases. However, note that 
both Faulí-Oller (2002) and Dragone et al. (2006) restrict their analyses to very spe-
cific cases – declining industries and industries with plenty competitors plus insig-
nificant fixed costs, respectively. We will address this issue more closely in our more 
general framework in section 4. 
 
3.3 Introducing Unprofitable Mergers 
We now introduce the consideration of unprofitable mergers in the FSF. Derived 
from the analysis in section 3.1, we consider the case of an output-reducing mer-
ger, i.e. 
 
∆XI < 0. It emerges from proposition 1 that this case is very reasonable be-
cause an increase in output requires substantially lower marginal costs of the 
merged entity compared to its constituent firms. As Farrell and Shapiro (1990: 111) 
note, “[m]ergers differ enormously in the extent to which productive assets can 
usefully be recombined”. The authors permit possible relationships between the 
merged entity’s cost function and the cost functions of its constituent firms, but 
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they explicitly refer to changes that follow anticompetitive motivations, rationaliza-
tion or synergies. Wherewith, it is implicitly assumed that the change in costs is 
positive (because the authors primarily consider output-reducing mergers, it is im-
plicitly assumed that this positive change in costs is not big enough). Since no a 
priori-assumptions on the merged entity’s cost function are made – except the ones 
given by conditions (2) and (3) – negative movements of costs due to a merger are 
not ruled out. 
 
If the assumption of privately profitable mergers is removed, two important con-
clusions can be drawn: Firstly, it is permitted that a change in costs due to a merger 
was misjudged, is unexpected or was intentional. Hence, we include both the cases 
of merger projects that appear profitable ex ante but turn out to be unprofitable ex 
post (failures in post-merger management, imperfect information, etc.) and of such 
that are already ex ante unprofitable but are conducted due to agency problems or 
preemptive and defensive strategies (managerial or consultancy interests, preemp-
tive and defensive mergers; see section 2). We treat both cases in the same way 
because from a competition policy perspective it is effects that matter and not mo-
tives: for merger control it is only relevant if the effects of a merger lead to a nega-
tive internal effect and not whether this was intentional or not. Secondly, this need 
not mean that mergers lead to losses; merely the change in insiders’ profits – after 
the merger combined in the merged entity – is now permitted to be negative. And 
thirdly, this also includes cases of self-interested managers with personal gains 
from unprofitable mergers (see section 2). While the gains for the managers repre-
sent a welfare increase that needs to be deducted from the losses for the share-
holders in the case of an unprofitable merger, it seems very unlikely and a far-
stretch to assume that these personal gains for few individuals may outweigh total 
unprofitability of a merger. Therefore, we do not explicitly model the manager 
gains-effect in the following. 
 
Otherwise, the framework of Farrell and Shapiro (1990) is maintained and now 
used to permit the possibility of unprofitable mergers, i.e. 
 
∆π I < 0. Given the rea-
sons that determine the change in insiders’ output, we focus on output reducing 
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mergers, i.e. 
 
∆XI < 0. This is most plausible if it is assumed that a negative change 
in insiders’ profits is the result of disadvantageous cost changes. 
 
Again the case of an infinitesimal merger is considered first. The external effect is 
given by (5). After converting η into market shares, i.e. 
 
λi si − sIi∈O∑ , the reasoning 
is thus analogous to the one given in proposition 4. A small reduction in insiders’ 
output has a net negative welfare effect on outsiders and consumers if and only if 
the sum of the outsiders’ market shares – weighted by their reaction parameters – 
is smaller than the insiders’ market shares, i.e. 
 
sI > λi sii∈O∑ . 
 
In order to discuss the total external effect the integral of infinitesimal changes 
must be considered. As noted above and given by (6) “the net externality is a 
weighted integral of η along a path from 
 
XI
initial  to 
 
XI
final ” (Farrell and Shapiro 1990: 
116). A sufficient condition for the total effect on outsiders and consumers to be 
negative is fulfilled if 
 
η < 0 after the merger (Farrell and Shapiro 1990: 116). It is 
sufficient for an output-reducing merger because η increases as 
 
XI  falls (see prop-
osition 5 in Farrell and Shapiro (1990: 116); the authors give sufficient conditions 
for an increase of η as
 
XI  falls). In this case, total welfare decreases as a result of an 
unprofitable merger. For η to be negative after the merger, it has to be sufficiently 
negative before the merger, i.e. 
 
λi xi << XIi∈O∑ . The other possibility is that η 
changes its sign in the course of the “infinitesimal mergers”, but the total external 
effect is negative. Both reflect the point that “big mergers” should be addressed 
with caution. 
 
Converting η into market shares, this means that the insiders’ market shares before 
the merger must be sufficiently large. In Fig. 1, this case is positioned in the south-
western quadrant δ. 
  
14 
 
 
 
*** INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE *** 
 
If the total external effect of an unprofitable merger is positive, two possibilities 
have to be considered: 
A. the negative change in insiders’ profits outweighs the positive external ef-
fect, which causes total welfare to fall (area ε), or 
B. the positive external effect is larger than the negative change in insiders’ 
profits, which causes total welfare to rise (area ζ ). 
 
In case A, the positive external effect must not be too large because the probability 
is increased that the profit change of the insiders will be outweighed. A sufficient 
condition for the external effect to be positive is given by 
 
η ≥ 0 before the merger. 
Firstly, the described situation is fulfilled the closer η lies to zero before the merger. 
Secondly, η changes its sign in the course of the “infinitesimal mergers” and the 
total effect is larger than zero. In both cases, the result is a fall in total welfare be-
cause the negative change in insiders’ output amounts to more than the positive 
external effect. Both mentioned cases again address caution towards the permis-
sion of “bigger mergers”. 
 
In case B, the positive external effect outweighs the change in insiders’ profits. De-
spite the unprofitability of the merger, total welfare rises. Therefore, the total ex-
ternal effect must be sufficiently large. Due to the relation between η and 
 
XI , this 
means that η has to be sufficiently large. The situation is most easily fulfilled if η is 
positive, both before and after the merger, i.e. the difference between the 
weighted market shares of the outsiders and the insiders’ market shares is positive 
before the merger and rises after it. Given that η is positive both before and after 
the merger this situation describes one possibility for the total external effect being 
large enough. Another possibility is that η changes sign and the functional relation 
 
η X( ) is strong enough so that the total effect can outweigh the negative change in 
insiders’ profits. This describes situations that are supported by sufficiently low 
market shares of the insiders (note that the reaction parameters λ of the outsiders 
would have to be considered as well, however, this complicates the analysis with-
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out altering the basic thought), and somewhat supports a cautious approach to-
wards so-called “safe harbour” provisions. 
 
4. Consequences for Merger Policy 
Farrell and Shapiro (1990) draw their policy conclusions under the restrictive as-
sumptions that only privately profitable mergers are proposed to the competition 
authorities. This implies that they (almost) exclusively look at the upper half of fig-
ure one. In doing so, their recommendation for merger policy reads: “Privately un-
profitable mergers will not be proposed, so proposed mergers should be permitted 
unless their external effects are ‘sufficiently’ bad to outweigh their private profita-
bility” (Farrell and Shapiro 1990: 116-117). The authors suggest a two-part proce-
dure for merger review by competition authorities (ibid: 117-118). First, determine 
the external effect ( IW π∆−∆ ). If it is positive, allow the merger (area α ). If it is 
negative, then, second, estimate the profit effect ( Iπ∆ ). If II W ππ ∆−∆>∆ , then 
allow the merger (efficiency defence; area β ), otherwise the merger should be 
prohibited (area γ ). 
 
Against the background of the empirics of mergers and acquisitions, however, the 
overall picture (according to section 3.3) must be interpreted in order to derive 
sound recommendations for competition authorities. Our interpretation of all six 
areas from the FSF (fig. 1), including the areas with unprofitable mergers (negative 
internal effect), reveals some concordance with Farrell and Shapiro, but also some 
extensions and divergences. 
 
Area ( α ): 00 >∆−∆∧>∆ II W ππ , both the internal and the external effect are 
positive. In compliance with Farrell and Shapiro, unconditional permission is rec-
ommended from a total-welfare perspective. Note, however, that employing a dif-
ferent welfare standard might alter the assessment. For instance, within EU compe-
tition policy, a consumer welfare standard is applied. While the total welfare stand-
ard seeks the maximisation of the sum of producers and consumers rent, the con-
sumer welfare standard seeks to maximise the consumers rent. The FSF does not 
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allow for straightforward conclusions regarding such a consumer welfare standard 
because the external effect ( IW π∆−∆ ) consists of elements of producers rents (the 
outsider firms to the merger) and the consumers surplus: CSW OI +∆=∆−∆ ππ . 
Therefore, despite an overall positive external effect, consumers might be hurt but 
their welfare loss is overcompensated by the increasing profits of the remaining 
competitors of the merging companies. The larger the external effect is, however, 
the less likely such a scenario becomes (if 0>>∆−∆ IW π , then 0>>>∆ Oπ  in order 
to allow for 0<CS ). Vice versa, a negative external effect need not necessarily im-
ply a reduction of consumer welfare since an increase in CS  might be overcom-
pensated by a loss in Oπ∆ . Again, this becomes less likely with an increasingly neg-
ative external effect. 
 
Area ( β ): 
 
∆π I > 0 and 0<∆−∆ IW π  with II W ππ ∆−∆>∆ , i.e. the positive inter-
nal effect outweighs the negative external effect. This is the area in which an effi-
ciency defence is meaningful and becomes an important element of a welfare-
maximising merger policy. Despite anticompetitive effects (a reduction of the sum 
of consumers rents and competitors rents), total welfare is increased because the 
efficiency gains from the merger overcompensate them. Thus, permission is rec-
ommended from a total welfare perspective. Furthermore, even under a consumer 
welfare standard, some β -mergers might be approvable, namely cases where the 
negative external effect results from a small increase in consumer welfare that is 
outweighed by a larger decrease in competitors welfare. Therefore, prohibiting all 
β -mergers would be against welfare maximisation even under a consumer welfare 
standard and, in some cases, protect competitors instead of consumers. 
 
Area (γ ): 
 
∆π I > 0 and 0<∆−∆ IW π  with II W ππ ∆−∆<∆ , i.e. the negative exter-
nal effect outweighs the positive internal effect. Mergers within this area are anti-
competitive. Thus, prohibition is recommended from a total welfare perspective.  
Area (δ ): 00 <∆−∆∧<∆ II W ππ , both the internal and the external effect are neg-
ative. This area consists of anticompetitive mergers: thus, prohibition is recom-
mended from a total welfare perspective. This area is neglected by the original FSF. 
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Therefore, a merger policy abstaining from the frequent occurrence of unprofitable 
mergers might err here. The FSF implies an asymmetric treatment: while a positive 
external effect suffices to allow a merger, a negative external effect is not sufficient 
to prohibit a merger, simply because the internal effect is assumed to be positive 
and, therefore, a trade-off inevitably arises. Consequently, δ -mergers would not be 
blocked automatically in the course of the two-part procedure suggested by Farrell 
and Shapiro (see above). Instead, their destiny would depend on the estimation of 
the internal effect that is – as Farrell and Shapiro (1990: 117-118) admit – subject 
to some error risk. False positives (allowing a welfare-reducing merger) might, nev-
ertheless, be rare since the competition authority should not find substantial effi-
ciencies in such cases (that potentially outweigh the negative external effect) and, 
thus, should – in practice – prohibit these cases anyway. A residual might arise in 
cases where the negative external effect is very small, and the authority is thus will-
ing to accept rather vague efficiencies because in a world without unprofitable 
mergers almost every merger would be able to offset a small negative external ef-
fect. Then, false positives could occur to a certain extent if awareness for the fre-
quent occurrence of privately unprofitable mergers is lacking.  
 
Area ( ε ): 0<∆ Iπ  and 0>∆−∆ IW π  with II W ππ ∆−∆>∆ , i.e. the negative in-
ternal effect outweighs the positive external effect. In this case, a merger policy 
following the original FSF analysis commits errors, more specifically false positives. 
Due to the positive external effect, the merger is allowed although total welfare is 
reduced. In the modified interpretation, where unprofitable mergers are consid-
ered, ε -mergers are anticompetitive and should be prohibited under a total wel-
fare standard. This leads to the important implication that the general recommen-
dation of the original FSF – every merger with a positive external effect should be 
permitted – cannot be sustained in the modified FSF (inclusion of privately unprof-
itable mergers).  
 
Result I: If unprofitable mergers are allowed to be proposed, a positive external ef-
fect does not represent a sufficient condition for the allowance of a merger any-
more! 
18 
 
 
 
If a consumer welfare standard is considered, then the assessment of area (ε ) be-
comes more difficult because of the positive external effect. The latter comprises 
the effect on competitors and consumers, so there can be a case where consumer 
welfare is positive. Therefore, while Result I stands that a positive external effect is 
not a sufficient condition to clear a merger proposal, ε -mergers are not generally 
prohibited under a strict consumer welfare standard – in contrast to a total welfare 
standard.  
 
Area (ζ ): 0<∆ Iπ  and 0>∆−∆ IW π  with II W ππ ∆−∆<∆ , i.e. the positive exter-
nal effect outweighs the negative internal effect. Although the original FSF does 
not expect ζ -mergers to occur, a respectively styled merger policy would not make 
mistakes in such cases. Due to the positive external effect, ζ -mergers would be 
allowed and this unwittingly corresponds to the resulting increase in total welfare. 
In a way, the right result is achieved for the wrong reasons.  
 
However, if total welfare should be maximised consequently according to this 
framework, then the allowance of actually proposed ζ -mergers would not suffice. 
Instead, it would imply enforcing ζ -mergers even against the wishes of the firms 
because it increases total welfare and is Kaldor-Hicks-superior (in accordance with 
Farrell and Shapiro (1990: 117, ft. 19) preferred to Pareto-optimality). As well as 
allowing an anticompetitive merger for efficiency reasons (area β ) by assessing and 
judging the private profitability of a merger project, a competition authority in the 
FSF maximises welfare if it evaluates and judges the external effect of possible mer-
gers (that are not proposed voluntarily by the companies) and instructs them to 
merge in case it finds them located in area ζ . The same holds for privately profita-
ble mergers that are not proposed due to the imperfections of the merger process 
and self-interested managers and advisers but that would increase total welfare (α
- and β -mergers). Alternatively, the competition authority could apply subsidies as 
an instrument to promote ζ -mergers (Faulí-Oller 2002; Dragone et al. 2006). The 
latter instrument might be viewed to be less controversial in regard to existing laws 
(private property rights) and related societal values (freedom of investment). How-
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ever, from a strict welfare point of view it is also less optimal because of the result-
ing burden on taxpayers. 
 
Farrell and Shapiro (1990: 117) explicitly reject compulsion or subsidies to imple-
ment ζ -mergers because “both of which would be enormous changes from our 
antitrust policy”. We find this reasoning, however, not very convincing. In their ar-
ticle, Farrell and Shapiro draw policy conclusions and recommend certain merger 
policies which implies that they intend to change hitherto antitrust policy in the 
first place. This stands in accordance with the widely held view that competition 
economics-research should be guiding the designing and reforming of practical 
competition policy. Moreover, a theory addressing why gradual changes shall be 
recommended but ‘enormous’ changes not (wherever the delineation lies) is not 
provided. Furthermore, it lies at the heart of the FSF that a competition authority 
should maximise welfare by evaluating, assessing and eventually judging concrete 
merger projects. It cannot be derived from the framework why the welfare maximi-
sation activities of the competition authority should be restricted to voluntarily 
proposed merger projects. This line of argument becomes strengthened if firms are 
assumed to also engage in unprofitable mergers. 
 
Despite rejecting Farrell and Shapiro’s reasoning against enforcing welfare-
enhancing mergers against the wishes of the companies, we share their concerns 
about a merger policy that instructs or subsidizes mergers. However, we find their 
reasons insufficient since the FSF does not include any element that rules out such 
a policy. Actually, the FSF on its own is compatible with a merger policy where the 
competition authority organizes and determines the market structure (instead of 
the competitive process) against the background of comprehensive evaluations of 
possible mergers and their welfare effects (orchestrative merger policy). Although 
this may appear to be too radical, there are actually tendencies towards a moderate 
version of this line of reasoning (Faulí-Oller 2002 and Dragone et al. 2006 represent 
considerable steps into this direction.). The European Commission, for instance, has 
increasingly taken a constructive stance towards resolving anticompetitive merger 
proposals (without prohibiting them). In extensive negotiations with the merging 
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companies and their competitors, the Commission seeks to develop remedies that 
mould the market structure in a way to maximize (consumer) welfare. This includes 
re-organizing market shares by orchestrated divestitures from the merging compa-
nies to (policy) selected competitors in order to rebuild the pre-merger market situ-
ation (Budzinski & Kuchinke 2012). Thus, although the Commission ‘only’ inter-
venes when a merger is voluntarily proposed by the companies, in the course of the 
merger control procedure, remedies may be negotiated that include additional 
takeovers by (previous) outsiders of the mergers induced by the competition au-
thority. The degree of active re-modelling of a market in the course of merger con-
trol has considerably increased and may represent a mild version of orchestrative 
merger policy. 
 
However, before implementing FSF into merger control, additional assumptions 
have to be relaxed and controlled for the subsequent effects. This includes ambi-
tious assumptions about the knowledge of the competition authority and the 
measurability of the actual internal and external effects. Additionally, it touches 
basic questions of the primacy of individual disposition about property rights (free-
dom of competition). Additionally, in a public choice view, the development to-
wards a comprehensive ‘merger control and instruction agency’ would enhance the 
powers and resources of a competition authority as a bureaucracy which could fuel 
the self-interested adoption of comparable reasoning. 
 
Result II: An isolated application of the modified FSF implies far-reaching and con-
troversial intervention opportunities for merger control authorities. 
 
5. Conclusion 
In this paper, we demonstrate that the popular FSF relies in its policy conclusions 
sensitively on the assumption that rational agents will only propose privately prof-
itable mergers. If this assumption held, a positive external effect of a proposed 
merger would represent a sufficient condition to allow the merger. However, the 
empirical picture on mergers and acquisitions reveals a significant share of unprof-
itable mergers and economic theory, moreover, demonstrates that privately unprof-
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itable mergers can be the result of rational action. Therefore, we extend the FSF by 
explicitly allowing unprofitable mergers to occur with some frequency. This exerts a 
considerable impact on merger policy conclusions: while several insights of the 
original FSF are corroborated (f.i. efficiency defence), a positive external effect does 
not represent a sufficient condition for the allowance of a merger anymore. Apply-
ing such a rule would cause a considerable amount of false positives. In addition, 
an isolated application of the modified FSF implies far-reaching and controversial 
intervention opportunities for merger control authorities. 
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 Appendix 
We regard a simple model which is able to describe all possible types of mergers 
out of the graphical illustration in Figure 1 by referring to the analysis of Salant et 
al. (1983) in conjunction with Dragone et al. (2006). 
 
Salant et al. (1983) regard the impact of mergers by referring to Cournot’s classic 
example. Given the notation of section 3 of our paper, inverse demand is given by 
( ) XXp −= β , with 0>β , X denotes total industry output and p denotes the price. 
The number of firms is exogenous and given by n. Firm i’s output is given by 
 
xi. It 
is assumed that the n firms are identical with the same marginal costs c and fixed 
costs F. Thus, total industry output is given by 
 
X = xii=1
n∑  and iij j xXx −=∑ ≠  
summarizes aggregated output of all firms other than firm i. 
 
Firm i now maximises its profit by setting 
 
xi, i.e. ( )max
i
ix
p X c x F− −   . Assuming 
that the n firms are identical, the output of each firm will be the same in a sym-
metric Nash equilibrium, i.e. xxx ji ==  (Salant et al. 1983: 191), which is given by 
( ) ( )1x c nβ= − + . Price and profit of each firm will, therefore, be given by 
( ) ( ) ( )1p X nc nβ= + +  and ( ) ( ) ( ) 21x c n Fπ β= − + −   , respectively. 
 
Now, 1m +  firms merge (“insiders”) and the number of independent firms decreas-
es to n m−  ( n m=  describes the limiting case of a monopolisation of a market). 
Thereby, m can be interpreted as the size of the merger, i.e. the market share of 
the merging firms (Salant et al. 1983: 193; Dragone et al. 2006: 3). Differently to 
the assumption of Salant et al. (1983: 191 et sqq.), the merging firms do not total-
ly shut down all of the plants but one. At this point, we rather refer to the analysis 
of Dragone et al. (2006). They assume that efficiency gains are “the outcome of an 
adjustment in fixed costs via the merger” (Dragone et al. 2006: 2). The reduction in 
total fixed costs of the insiders following the merger amounts to a fraction smaller 
than mF because of a “restructuration of production plants within the resulting 
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firm” (Dragone et al. 2006: 4); fixed costs of the resulting  firm amount to ( )1 e F+  
with ( )0, 1e m∈ − . The parameter e thus describes the inefficiency of the merger, 
i.e. a higher value of e is equal to lower restructuration gains. Marginal costs are 
unchanged. 
 
Industry output and price are now given by 
1
ˆ ˆn m iiX x
−
=
= ∑  and 
 
p ˆ X ( )= β − ˆ X , respec-
tively, whereas the roof denotes the post-merger situation. Each firm’s output in 
the new symmetric Nash equilibrium is given by ( ) ( )ˆ 1x c n mβ= − − + . The result-
ing price ( ) ( ) ( )ˆ 1p X n m c n mβ= + − − +    is larger than ( )Xp  for cβ > , which 
must be fulfilled to have a strictly positive industry output. Insiders’ profits and the 
profits of the 1n m− −  outsiders (non-merging firms) amount to 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )2ˆ 1 1I x c n m e Fπ β= − − + − +    and ( ) ( ) ( )
2ˆ 1O x c n m Fπ β= − − + −   , respec-
tively. 
 
According to Salant et al. (1983: 190-191) the profitability of a merger is given by 
the difference between the post-merger profit ( )ˆI xπ  and the sum of the pre-
merger profits of the 2 insiders (The first derivative with respect to m is given by 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )2 3 2 22 1 1
I
c n m c n F
m
π
β β
∂∆
= − − + − − + +
∂
): 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ){ } ( )2 2 2ˆ 1 1 1 1I I x m x c n m m n m e Fπ π π β − −∆ = − + = − − + − + + + − . (0.1) 
Joint Profits of the outsiders and the consumer surplus (CS) change as follows: 
 ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
22 2
2 2
3 1 2 1
ˆ1
1 1
O O
m m n m n c
n m x x
n n m
β
π π π
 − − + − −  ∆ = − − − =  + − +
, and (0.2) 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
22
2 2
2 1 2 1ˆ
2 1 1
m n nm n c
CS CS X CS X
n m n
β + − + − ∆ = − =
− + +
, respectively. (0.3)  
This results in the determination of the external effect due to Farrell and Shapiro 
(1990), i.e. the sum of the consumer surplus and joint outsiders’ profits 
( )OCS π∆ + ∆ : 
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( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
22
2 2
2 1 4 2 1 2
2 1 1
O
m m m nm m n c
CS
n m n
β
π
 − − − + − − ∆ + ∆ =
− + +
. (0.4) 
The change in total welfare due to a merger is thus given by: 
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Thus, we can now describe the effect of a merger in settings which differ in the 
crucial parameters m, e and F. The first variation considers different sizes of mer-
gers, the second variation considers the efficiency of restructuration due to mer-
gers, and the third variation considers the possible amount of the second variation. 
Thereby, it is possible to describe all mergers out of the graphical illustration in Fig-
ure 1. 
 
Generally, an increase of the inefficiency parameter e reduces the profitability of 
the merger. Given the merger of two or few firms, the variation goes along the ar-
eas α, ζ, ε. Thus, the change in total welfare is more likely to be positive but small, 
and at some point it drops below the 45°-line into the negative part. However, the 
change of the external effect does not turn out to be negative due to a positive 
development of the outsiders’ profits. In contrast, if many firms merge, the change 
of the external effect does not turn out to be positive due to the highly negative 
impact on consumer surplus. Then, an increase of the inefficiency parameter e also 
reduces the profitability of the merger, but the variation now goes along the areas 
β, γ, δ. Thus, an efficiency defence is more likely for high efficiencies; the change in 
total welfare quickly drops below the 45°-line into the negative part. 
 
The number of merging firms also has a clear impact, which can be shown in a 
counter clockwise move along the areas. The effects of a smaller number of firms 
can more often be illustrated by areas ε, ζ, α, whereas the effects of a higher num-
ber of merging firms can more often be illustrated by areas β, γ, δ. 
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High fixed costs make the mergers more profitable, i.e. savings are possible in a 
higher amount. This result holds for few as well as for many merging parties. 
Thereby, a higher inefficiency parameter e increases the amount of fixed costs 
needed to turn a merger into profitability. Given two or few merging parties, in-
creasing fixed costs leads to a variation along the areas ε, ζ, α. Thus, the change in 
total welfare turns from negative into positive and the change of the external effect 
does not turn out to be negative due to a positive development of the outsiders’ 
profits. In contrast, if many firms merge, the change of the external effect does not 
turn out to be positive due to the highly negative impact on consumer surplus. 
Then, an increase of the fixed costs F also increases the profitability of the merger, 
but the variation now goes along the areas δ, γ, β. Furthermore, small changes in 
the amount of fixed costs now also have very high impacts and the resulting effects 
of a merger quickly switch between the mentioned areas. 
 
Unprofitability of a merger is possible in this simple framework if many firms merge 
(i.e. a high market share of the merging firms) and/or if the inefficiency parameter 
is high (i.e. a merger unlikely leads to efficiencies). 
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Fig. 1: Welfare Effects of Horizontal Mergers (modified version from Farrell and 
Shapiro’s (1990: 117) original). 
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